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Ethics of Property, Ethics of Poverty 
 
For most contemporaries, private property is so unquestionable a principle that the idea of 
probing its validity or inquiring into its foundation seems sacrilegious. As for the possibility 
of voluntarily renouncing it, it is barely imaginable. Yet, although it is difficult to imagine life 
without private property, it is surprisingly difficult to justify it. It is often assumed that 
property is natural and necessary for the well-being of individuals and the maintenance of 
social order. This alleged naturalness would turn it into an inalienable right while its alleged 
necessity would turn its effects into social goods. Without it, wouldn’t we feel deprived? 
Wouldn’t we lose any motivation to act or work? Wouldn’t we lose our sense of 
responsibility? Wouldn’t society cease to function? Yet, the urgency with which we run to the 
defense of property and proclaim it an undeniable requirement, a just institution, and a moral 
good betrays some uneasiness.  
This issue reached an unprecedented importance during the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries as a new 
moral ideal appeared, an ethics of dispossession ˗ paupertas altissima. It is often said that the 
late medieval period saw the birth of claims to individual private rights.
1
 While this is 
probably true, we must also observe that it occurred in a context of profound questioning and 
contestation. What’s more, this was not a purely speculative debate; at least for some, it 
became a form of life. Finally, the issue had a political impact: it entailed a critique of the 
clergy’s lavish lifestyle and the tendency of the Church, arguably the first international 
corporation, to amass riches.
2
  
The debate engages two different questions, which, for being interwoven, are nevertheless 
distinct: (a) a metaphysical and juridical question concerning the nature and justification of 
                                                          
1
 Christopher Pierson, Just Property, A History in the Latin West, Vol. 1: Wealth, Virtue, and the Law, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 96. Pierson’s work is essential to the study of this question and 
the present essay is indebted to it.  
2
 Marcilius of Padua offers a strong support to the “perfection of poverty” championed by the Franciscan 
order and a very explicit condemnation of clerical and papal abuses. According to Marcilius, the members 
of the episcopate “have a burning desire for pleasures, vanities, temporal possessions, and secular 
rulership, and they pursue and attain these objectives with all their energies not by rightful means, but by 
wrongdoing both secret and open.” Marcilius of Padua The Defender of the Peace (Defensor Pacis), trans. 
A. Gewirth (New York: Harper, 1956) 185 
2 
 
property and (b) an ethical question concerning wealth and our attitude toward it. At stakes 
are notions such as ‘dominion,’ ‘possession,’ ‘use,’ ‘proper,’ ‘common,’ and ‘poverty’ which, 
prima facie, are quite ordinary and readily understood, yet prove particularly difficult to 
delineate with precision. Some contemporary legal scholars have argued that the transition 
from the traditional sense of property as involving materials to the modern conception that 
sees property as a “bundle of rights” that includes intangibles (e.g., intellectual property, 
copyrights, and promissory notes) has led to the disintegration of the notion. Thomas Grey, 
who defends the so-called “eliminative position,” declares that, ultimately, property “ceases to 
be an important category in legal and political theory.”3 The notion would now be replaced by 
a multiplicity of specialized conceptions that do not overlap and even conflict in some cases. 
Depending on the circumstances, rights and obligations vary greatly: for instance, one who 
possesses intellectual property doesn’t have the same rights as one who owns a house.  
However, even if it is so for lawyers and businessmen in the ordinary course of their practice, 
a fundamental philosophical issue remains. How should we relate to the things in the natural 
world? Who can have property? What rights do I have to claim anything as mine? What 
conception of humanity is assumed in homo possessor? To subject things to my dominion, I 
must in the first place be a subject; there is no “mine” if I am not an “I.” Thus, in order to 
claim ownership I must stand over and against the other beings that populate the world. What 
is at stake is an ethical question in the most basic sense: it is a matter of ethos, that is to say, 
of life form. 
To make sense of the medieval debate it is important to first understand its conceptual 
background. Despite their divergence, medieval thinkers share a conceptual vocabulary that 
articulates a vast set of ideas, distinctions, and assumptions that forms a common framework. 
I will begin this essay by tracing the parameters within which the debate occurred, focusing 
on three authoritative sources: Scripture, Roman law, and the ancient philosophical tradition. 
In the second part I will analyze the justification of property as it is articulated in particular by 
Augustine and Aquinas. Their thought ended up being the dominant and “official” doctrine- 
although it is not devoid of ambiguities and uneasiness. Finally, I will conclude on the 
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challenge raised by the Franciscan controversy on the status of the mendicant orders and the 
debate on poverty in which Bonaventure played a key role.  
I  Authorities and Foundational Narratives 
Medieval philosophy operates within a circle of recognized authorities and authoritative texts 
the command of which was essential to the training of a university Master. Medieval legal 
theory is no exception. On the issue of property, medieval thinkers appealed to three major 
sources: Scripture, Roman legal theory, and the ancient pagan philosophers (the knowledge of 
which varied greatly depending on what was available to scholars at different times). These 
authorities, however, do not offer an unambiguous teaching nor are they necessarily in 
agreement with each other. In this matter too philosophy is inseparable from hermeneutics 
and innovation doesn’t occur without interpretation.  
The primary task of the Church Fathers during the first five centuries of the Common Era was 
to define Christianity by determining what is canonical (what counts as Scripture) and what is 
orthodox (what Scripture means). What then, according to Scripture, should be the proper 
relation of a Christian to property? As Pierson puts it “among those texts which were seen as 
more or less unproblematically of divine inspiration (those works which became a part of the 
New Testament canon), the message on property seemed troublingly ambiguous” (Pierson, 
59). In multiple occurrences, Jesus expresses contempt for riches while the poor are promised 
the kingdom of God (Luke, 6:20). Three Gospels (Mark, Matthew, and Luke) recount the story 
of a young and wealthy man anxious to know how he may receive eternal life. Obedience to 
the Old Law is not sufficient; rather, Jesus commands him to “sell whatsoever thou hast, and 
give to the poor, and thou shall have treasure in heaven.” Then, in response to the 
astonishment of his disciples, Jesus, famously, declares: “How hardly shall they that have 
riches enter into the kingdom of God! […] It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a 
needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God” (Mark, 10: 23, 25). This claim 
goes much further than promoting an ethics of giving; this is an exhortation to abandon wealth 
and shed earthly goods as one would an unnecessary burden. The story can also be read along 
with Luke, 14: 26: “If anyone comes to me and doesn’t hate his father and mother, his wife 
and children, his brothers and sisters- yes, even his own life- he cannot be my disciple.” On 
this account, property is associated with sinfulness and is irreconcilable with a godly life; 
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salvation and wealth are simply incompatible. In a striking formula James declares: “Your 
riches are corrupted, and your garments are moth-eaten. Your gold and silver are rusted and 
their rust will be a witness against you and will eat your flesh as it were fire” (James, 5.2-3). 
Greed is not just morally reprehensible; according to Tertullian, it has its source in the sin of 
covetousness which is considered the “root of all evil.”4  
Those who embrace an apocalyptic narrative are keen to stress these passages that agree with 
Jesus’ claim according to which the end of the world will come within his generation (Luke, 
21:32).  If the end of times is imminent, it is pointless to cling to impermanent possessions. 
This abnegation of wealth expresses a general resentment against the world ˗ a profane world 
of sin ˗ which separates us from the promised kingdom of God. Thus Augustine mentions that 
“Cain, whose name means ‘possession,’ is the founder of the earthy city. This indicates that 
this city has its beginning and end on this earth, where there is no hope of anything beyond 
what can be seen in this world.” (De civitate Dei, XV, 17). Even Augustine, however, didn’t 
hold this interpretation throughout his career and at times express a more conciliatory 
position.
5
  
Another essential Scriptural text on the question of property, the Acts of the Apostles, 
indicates that the early Church at Jerusalem held property in common:  
A multitude of them that believed who were of one heart and of one soul; neither said 
any of them that aught of the things which he possessed was his own, but they had all 
things in common. Neither was there any among them that lacked: for as many as were 
possessors of lands or houses sold them and brought the prices of the things that were 
sold and laid them down at the apostles’ feet; and distribution was made unto every man 
according as he had need” (Acts, 4:32, 34). 
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Communal property contributes to the transformation of a “multitude” into a community of 
“one heart and of one soul.”  
The positive relation I have to what I own presupposes a foundational act of appropriation 
which, by definition, excludes others. When property becomes private, others must be 
deprived. Even common property, by granting right of use to the members of a specific 
community, wards members of other community off it. To own is ipso facto to exclude and to 
exclude even those who have a greater need. Without this act of exclusion property could not 
occur. One possible way of reconciling the rejection of wealth advocated in the Gospels with 
the practices of ordinary life or the material owned by the Church is to argue that in order to 
flee from the approaching ruin of this world, a rich man should give up his wealth to the 
“celestial treasury” since God is the only true possessor of all wealth.6 While the ultimate goal 
is the City of God, we live in the earthly city and in this world to endow the Church is to give 
back to God.  
If medieval thinking on property operates within the framework of Scriptural teachings its 
juridical apparatus, however, is mostly derived from Roman law, particularly the Corpus Juris 
Civilis, a legal compendium composed in the 6
th
 century under the rule of the Eastern Roman 
Emperor Justinian. The basic distinction between iuris civilis (which governs citizens), iuris 
gentium (the law of nations or people which governs foreigners and citizen alike), and iuris 
naturale (natural law, the source of the other two) is at the heart of the ancient Roman 
thinking about property.
7
 This distinction articulates the legal apparatus in terms of 
spontaneous and conventional, untaught and taught, universal and particular but also, and 
importantly, in terms of original and derivative. The Institutes of Justinian declares that 
“natural law is clearly the older, having been instituted by nature at the first origin of 
mankind, whereas civil laws came into existence when states began to be founded, 
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magistrates to be created, and laws to be written” (Institutes, II, 1, 11).8 Accordingly, the task 
of the jurist is to bring the civil law in agreement with the natural law. When then is property 
located? Can it be traced back to the root of all laws? Does it belong to the natural order of 
things? Does it occur through rational nature (iuris gentium)? Or is it merely the result of a 
particular civil agreement (iuris civilis)? In accord with the genealogical order that derives 
civil from natural, the Digest defends a version of the natural origin of property thesis: 
The younger Nerva says that the ownership of things originated in natural possession 
and that a relic thereof survives in the attitude to those things which are taken on land, 
sea, or in the air; for such things forthwith become the property of those who first take 
possession of them. In like manner, things captured in war, islands arising in the sea, 
germs, stones, pearls found on the seashore become the property of him who first 
takes possession of them. (Digest, 41. 2. 1). 
Property is “natural” not because people have an innate right to own things, but in the sense 
that whatever nature produces has no initial owner. In the state of nature, the land is “no 
man’s land,” and it is this absence of original property that justifies the initial act of 
acquisition; it is because it belongs to no one that you can justly claim that a thing is yours. 
Nature provides; to take from it is to receive its gifts. Surprisingly perhaps, the Digest places 
in the same category things found on the ground and “things captured in war” even though in 
the second case whatever is captured is taken by force from someone who, presumably, was 
entitled to it. The two instances were nevertheless assimilated on the ground that war cancels 
civil laws and thus returns things to a state of nature.
9
  
The basic form of appropriation is occupatio, the acquisition of ownership of a res nullius 
(nobody’s property) by taking physical control of it. This, as we saw, assumes that things are 
originally available to all and anyone. Some medieval thinkers, however, doubted that this 
initial occupatio is enough to justify dominion. Thus in Ordinatio IV, Scotus declares that 
although “in the natural state he who first finds a thing necessarily might use it as far as he 
needed it” this doesn’t show that in the natural state there is distinct dominium. “Occupancy 
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referred only to common use.”10 A secondary mode of acquiring property is by traditio, i.e., 
through the delivery of possession with the intention of passing ownership by giving, 
bequeathing, selling, and the like. The main difference between occupatio and traditio is that 
in the second case the thing already had the status of a property; it is the owner who changes. 
Thus, what is passed on is not simply a (movable or immovable) object but the legal title. To 
signify the transfer of this incorporeal title a ceremony was often required (at least in cases of 
res mancipi or things held as particularly valuable) in order to mark symbolically that it is 
ownership itself and not simply the object that is transmitted.
11
  
To own something entails having dominium over it; the converse, however, is not necessarily 
true. In general the notion of dominium connotes the power that a dominant entity exercises 
over a subjugated being. But the meaning of dominium varies according to the kind of things 
it applies to and, despite its name, it was probably never taken to be truly “absolute.”12 The 
Justinian Code, for instance, not only never advocated the ius utendi et abutendi (the so-called 
‘right to use and abuse’) but on the contrary declares that it is in the interest of the 
commonwealth that no one shall make ill use of their property.
13
 Thus, Ockham defined 
dominium in the narrow sense as signifying that the holder “may treat it [a good] in any way 
not forbidden by natural law.”14 According to J. Coleman, “in the twelfth and thirteenth 
century there was a blurring of a distinction that had been crucial to the Romans between 
holding office and owning property. This confusion of office and ownership paralleled a 
comparable development in secular political life and is reflected in their use of the single 
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word dominium to denote both proprietary right and governmental authority.” 15  While a 
Roman lawyer would have used “dominium” to denote property rights alone, as Coleman 
observes, it is significant that modern English speakers understand “dominion” as denoting 
governmental authority.  
According to Roman law, possessio occurs when two conditions are met: a person must have 
(a) corpus i.e., sufficient control over a thing and (b) animus i.e., the requisite intention or 
manifest will to treat something as one’s own. Thus, in principle, infants and the insane 
(furiosi) are excluded.16 The second requirement (animus or intention to own) will be of great 
importance in the mendicant dispute. Thus in the 14
th
 century Marcilius of Padua insists that 
to have dominion requires the will to exercise and defend dominion. Likewise, appealing to 
the Roman law, Bonaventure declares: “it is stipulated in the law that liberty cannot be 
acquired for he who does not wish it and that a benefit is not given to an unwilling person” 
(Defense, XI, 9, 311). But how from this state of affairs does a right emerge? At what point 
and through what process does a fact (detentio) become a right (possessio)? To answer this 
difficult question the Roman jurists appealed to the notion of usucaptio which is best defined 
as the acquisition of a thing through possessing it without interruption for a certain period of 
time. Thus, so long as it had a “valid beginning” (bonum initium)– i.e., the good wasn’t 
stolen, had been obtained in good faith and with “just cause”- the passage of time is all it 
takes to turn having into owning. This doctrine responded to a practical concern: land-
grabbers taking possession of a land as soon as the previous owner had been evicted had an 
interest in establishing lawful title as quickly as possible (Pierson, 57).
17
 Thus, to require 
usucaptio (two years for land and one for chattels) was a way of preventing uncertainty over 
titles and to answer a particular problem. But usucaptio is not just an ad hoc solution to a 
practical problem; it also articulates the belief that prolonged possession of a good generates a 
right, that a de jure claim can, in some sense, be derived from a de facto state of affairs. 
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Finally, two main sources from pagan thought had a great impact on medieval jurists and 
philosophers: Aristotle and the Stoics.  
Classical Greek thought regards property as a matter of oikonomia, i.e., as belonging to the 
sphere of activities concerned with the handling and management of assets and material 
goods. To situate the issue at this level is already to indicate that it is an ancillary skill and 
that it cannot count as an end in itself. The value of economy resides entirely in the fact that it 
provides the necessary conditions that make possible something else, something infinity more 
important, namely: an active and virtuous life.  
Initially, Aristotle focuses on the distinction between public and private. Theoretically, 
various permutations are possible; for instance, we could eliminate common property 
altogether and place everything in the hands of private interests. This, however, would be 
absurd and dangerous; it would be the end of the political community. To treat everything as a 
commodity, to place every aspect of life in the hands of private entities would tear apart the 
social fabric. Politics is about co-existence and there is no co-existence where there is no 
commonwealth. But then, where should we draw the line? What should be private? What 
should be held in common? Should we, as Plato suggested, give it a maximal extension so 
that what is held in common includes almost everything (even women and children)?  
This is both impractical and undesirable. Consequently, Aristotle’s discussion of property is 
primarily about land. Appealing to a distinction between ownership and use, Aristotle 
eventually declares that private ownership with common use is preferable on the ground that 
private property has the added advantage of preventing disputes about the distribution of 
goods whereas to share without clear rules of allocations is to open the door to endless 
disputes. 
When each attends to his own property, men will not complain against one another, 
and they will produce more since each will be paying special attention himself to what 
he regards as being his own; while on the other hand because of virtue the use of 
property will agree with the proverb according to which ‘common are the possessions 
of friends’ (Pol. 1263a27-32).  
Assuming optimal conditions private property has the advantage of quelling feuds as people 
agree on recognizing each other’s spheres of rights. Furthermore, private property provides 
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the satisfaction associated with what is one’s own and the result of one’s own achievement; as 
Aristotle puts it: “to regard property as one’s own gives a man immense pleasure; for it is 
indeed natural and not in vain for each man to love himself” (1263a42-1263b1). It also 
improves the care devoted to what is one’s own. 18  Finally, some virtues, for instance 
generosity, couldn’t be exercised without private ownership and personal resources. Thus, for 
all the above mentioned reasons and for the sake of political stability the State should 
guarantee some minimum level of property.
19
 During the Scholastic era, Albert and Aquinas 
will follow these arguments very closely. 
Faithfully or not, Aristotle’s defense of private property has been rehashed for centuries. Yet, 
before praising or disparaging it, we should observe Aristotle’s ambivalence. Private property 
is at the service of common use which is conducive to virtue and friendship. “In these [well 
administered states] each has his own property; yet, he makes available a part of it to his 
friends and another part for common use” (1263a34-35).20 By itself, the art of acquisition is 
certainly not where the good life can be found; quite to the contrary, the relentless yearning 
for accumulation (pleonexia) is a recipe for a life of constant frustration. For all his 
idiosyncrasy, Epicurus expressed a view shared by many ancient philosophers when he 
declares that “nothing is enough to someone for whom what is enough is little” (Vatican 
Sayings, 68). Augustine likewise acknowledges the danger of pleonexia albeit for theological 
reasons: “Fear is all the more increased and covetousness is all the more unloosened 
according as there is an increase of those things which are called riches […] Riches, more 
than anything else, engender pride.”21  
Ancient philosophers, however, didn’t limit themselves to discussing the relative merits of 
private versus common property. In fact, this debate does not say anything about the 
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ontological status and the justification of property. For this, we need first to turn our attention 
to the human psyche. The first thing I can truly call ‘mine’ is myself; the self appears 
simultaneously as owner and owned. To be is not just to be alive but to live one’s own life. 
The human psyche presents a remarkable property: it can master itself (albeit with various 
degrees of success). Without this temperance (the virtue that deals with the appetites) would 
not be possible since to be temperate is to control oneself.
22
 This means that I (acting) and 
‘me’ (object acted upon) must, somehow, be different; otherwise, as Plato observed, the soul 
couldn’t be in conflict with itself (Republic, IV 431a). Yet, obviously there is only one “me;” 
therefore, this difference must be internal. Plato portrays the human psyche as an inner 
political arena; it is not only a seat of plurality but of conflicts and struggles, authority and 
obedience. Psyche relates to itself as observer and observed, ruler and ruled; it is a self-
relation which allows human beings to be responsible for themselves, caring for themselves, 
and controlling themselves, all traits that make what we call “personhood” possible. Thus we 
can describe the accomplished act of being human as an act whereby one owns oneself. It is 
precisely for this reason that, according Aquinas, dominium is inscribed in human nature: 
“Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so just as he has dominion over what is within 
himself, in the same way he can have dominion over other things […] in man reason has the 
position of a master and not of a subject” (I Q 96, A2) although Aquinas adds that this 
dominion is not a matter of commanding but of using. In order to claim property rights over a 
natural thing outside me, I must treat that aspect of myself which resembles most a natural 
thing as something I own.  
To appeal to the soul is, in some sense, to naturalize property. Even defenders of the 
mendicants will acknowledge the point. Thus, Marsilius of Padua declares:  
This term ‘ownership’ is used to refer to the human will or freedom in itself with its 
organic executive or motive power unimpeded. For it is through this that we are 
capable of certain acts and their opposite. It is for this reason too that man alone 
among the animals is said to have ownership or control of his acts: this control 
belongs to him by nature, it is not acquired through an act of will or choice.
23
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But of course, as Marsilius will argue, if the ability to have ownership or control of oneself is 
part of our nature by virtue of the faculty of willing [velle], then not willing [nolle] to own an 
external object is also exercising our natural capacities.  
Any defense of property rights that embraces this view should recognize, at least implicitly, 
the peril it harbors. The very properties that can objectify my virtue can also be my downfall. 
If the rightful possession of something is grounded in the condition that I own myself, that I 
exercise self-control, then those who become ensnarled by the very things they possess lose 
control of themselves. The moral danger is that as one accumulates goods, one can end up not 
simply obsessed by the relentless desire to acquire more but literally possessed by it. A life 
lived for the sake of having or for the sake of self-gratification would be a corruption of the 
only thing that justifies property. Thus, if I must be free in order to own, I must also be free 
from what I own. This moral ambiguity didn’t escape the attention of medieval thinkers.  
The Stoics pursued the exploration of this metaphysical hypothesis and their observations had 
a significant impact on medieval thought too. While Stoic ethics places wealth among the 
indifferents, property can nevertheless be traced back to a phenomenon observable in animals 
no less than in humans: “oikeiōsis” (variably translated as “disposition,” “appropriation,” 
“familiarity,” “affinity,” or “endearment”). The term designates the appropriation to oneself, 
the perception of oneself as well as of something else as one’s own;24 it is related to oikeiotes, 
which denotes the sense of belonging, of being at home. Thus, oikeiōsis designates a care for 
oneself that also extends beyond the self. On this view, all human beings (indeed, all sentient 
beings) are the rightful owner of themselves.  
Insofar as some things possess the intangible property of being owned, a theory of property 
needs a metaphysical account. But insofar as it seeks a beginning in some original act of 
appropriation, a theory of property also needs a foundational myth, an “in illo tempore” story of 
a primordial age of innocence that ignored lack and want and is now lost. This loss is supposed 
to explain the sinfulness and scarcity of our times. In Letter 90, Seneca declares that “the first 
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 “Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends that the dearest thing to every animal is its 
own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living 
thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or 
affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal 
made it near and dear to itself” (Diogenes Laertius, 7. 85). 
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men and those who sprang from them, still unspoiled, followed nature.”25 Primeval life was ruled 
by a fellowship which “remained unspoiled for a long time, until avarice tore the community 
asunder and became the cause of poverty, even in the case of those whom she herself had most 
enriched.” Avarice introduces evil and with it the rise of a second age of humanity.26   
Christian thinkers will likewise conclude from the similar myth of Genesis that private property 
can only be a sign of our fallen condition. Thus, in the prelapsarian state of mankind common 
property had preeminence over private property: the goods of creation are destined for the whole 
human race and although the fall alters the human condition, it doesn’t erase this original divine 
dispensation for all.
27
 In a postlapsarian condition, however, appropriation is a legitimate means 
to satisfy human needs and maintain wellbeing. Thus, the universal destination of goods remains 
primordial. As Augustine notes, private property depends on civil law, for the earth was given by 
God to all mankind. Or, as Bonaventure puts it: “we should understand that private property 
resulted from the iniquity of the first parents, because if they [Adam and Eve] had not sinned, 
there would have been no appropriation of this kind.”28 For the medieval thinkers, however, it is 
fundamental to distinguish between what results from sin and what constitutes an actual sin. 
Private property may result from sin without being intrinsically sinful. In the original condition, 
God entrusts the earth and its fruits to the common stewardship of mankind.  
If it is so, however, it becomes difficult to avoid the thought that at bottom private property 
results from an act which, although it couldn’t have been a theft since things didn’t have a prior 
owner, was nevertheless a violent appropriation that deprived others. A possible consequence 
one could draw from the foundational myth is that in a sense no property can be truly justified. 
At best, we have only guardianship. As Seneca puts it, if one complains that he is being driven 
from the farm which his father and grandfather owned, it can always be answered: 
Well? Who owned the land before your grandfather? Can you explain what people (I 
will not say what person) held it originally? You did not enter upon it as a master, but 
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 Seneca, Moral Epistles, Vol. II, Transl. R. M. Gummere, Loeb (Harvard: Harvard University Press 
1920) 397 
26 “But avarice broke in upon a condition so happily ordained, and, by its eagerness to lay something 
away and to turn it to its own private use, made all things the property of others, and reduced itself from 
boundless wealth to straitened need. It was avarice that introduced poverty and, by craving much, lost 
all.” (Seneca, Letter 90, 425) 
27
 This at least was the dominant narrative. John XXII’s Quia Vir Reprobus constitutes an important 
deviation from this view since it argues that property was originally private. See below part III.  
28 Bonaventure, Defense of the Mendicants (Works of Bonaventure, Vol. 15) Trans. José de Vinck and 
Robert J. Karris (Saint Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2010), 252. 
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merely as a tenant. And whose tenant are you? If your claim is successful, you are 
tenant of the heir. The lawyers say that public property cannot be acquired privately by 
possession; what you hold and call your own is public property – indeed, it belongs to 
mankind at large. (Letter 88, 355-7) 
In fact many thinkers (including Seneca himself) shrunk away from this idea which seems to 
condemn all social civil order as unjust and unjustifiable.
29
 As a consequence, it will be an 
important task for medieval thinkers to ward off this idea and determine the condition of a just 
property in accord with religious dogma and rational analysis. Their effort will result in the 
establishment of what could be called an ‘official doctrine,’ but it will not be without 
contestation.  
 
II: Just Ownership: Augustine, Aquinas  
Most medieval thinkers who discussed the status of property ownership asked three questions: 
(a) What is the source of property? (b) Under what condition is acquiring property rightful? and 
(c) what constitutes its right use? Even those who justified private property, however, admitted 
that the institution is fundamentally a human device rather than a divine institution. From that 
standpoint, property can be seen as a subset of the more general question concerning the purpose 
and justification of social organization. To this, the general answer is that in the present 
condition of fallenness it is necessary to impose restraints on human sinfulness; in a similar 
manner, ownership rights are necessary in order to restrain violent accumulation and theft. But in 
order to be just, human institutions must also agree with divine dispensation. Thus, virtually all 
defenses of the right to property see it as a necessary institution but also as one that must be 
restricted.  
In the Christian West, Augustine and Aquinas more than anyone else contributed to shaping the 
core principles that guide reasoning in this matter. Concerning the origin of property Augustine 
makes the following observation:  
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 A remarkable exception is the Pseudo-Pelagius’ De divitiis. The anonymous author argues that wealth 
cannot be just and that the few who are rich are the reason for the many who are poor. See Anon. ‘De 
divitiis (On Riches)’ in A. Bradstock and C. Rowland (eds.) Radical Christian Writings (Oxford: 
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Look, there are villas! By what right do you protect those villas? By divine or human 
right? Let them reply: ‘Divine right we have in the Scriptures; human rights in the laws 
of kings.’ On what basis does anyone possess what he possesses? Is it not by human 
right? By divine right ‘the earth and its fullness belong to the Lord’ (Ps. 24. 1). God 
made the poor and the rich from one clay and the one earth supports both the poor and 
the rich. Nevertheless, by human right one says ‘this villa is mine; this house is mine; 
this slave is mine.’ Thus, by human right, by right of emperors. Why? Because God has 
distributed these same human rights to the human race through the emperors and kings 
of the world.
30
 
Thus, in its basic form human property is relative. Despite social agreements and customs we 
do not truly own what we possess. All that is not by divine institution is an impermanent 
order. The human laws in the name of which I claim that this thing is mine cannot supersede 
the ultimate divine ownership of all things. In fact, on occasion the laws of emperors and 
kings protect even the interests of those who acquired unjustly their wealth. Nevertheless, 
from the fact that private property was not contained in the original edenic state it does not 
follow that it must be condemned altogether. This imperfect arrangement whereby mine and 
thine are distinguished may contribute to a more peaceful social order and while a human 
invention, it is not thereby opposed to divine disposition.  
However it would be incorrect to conclude from this remark in the Tractates on John that 
Augustine abandons the jurisdiction of private property to the relativism of the law of the 
land. Laws have a remedial purpose: the restraint of violence and, ultimately, earthy authority 
remains accountable to divine authority. Finally, although the temporal law, by itself, cannot 
be the source of right possession, it may be so insofar as “God has distributed these same 
human rights to the human race through the emperors and kings of the world.”31 What is 
ordained by the will of human rulers is distributed by divine law; God’s providence works 
through the tribulations of history.  
What interests most Augustine is not the juridical claims or the legal apparatus that property 
rights require but the nature of our relation to things that the very existence of property 
presupposes. Property is a determinate mode of our attachment to things. To own is to 
absolutize this attachment by warding off the possibility of losing what we covet. The fear 
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 Augustine, Tractates on John VI, 25 in Augustine Political Writings eds. E. Fortin and D. Kries, Transl. 
M. Tkacz and D. Kries (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 248-249. 
31
 “Quia ipsa iura humana per imperatores et reges saeculi Deus distribuit generi humano.” 
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of destitution is never far away from the desire to own. The broadest term for this 
attachment, perhaps, is “love.” Love attaches an object to a subject, but since the term ‘love’ 
is such a broad term it is of great importance to clarify its form and the nature of its object. 
At an initial level, Augustine poses a basic distinction between cupiditas (love directed at 
earthly things), and caritas (love of the summum bonum). Thus, the earthly city is ruled by 
cupiditas while the heavenly one is governed by caritas. Although they both are forms of 
love, the movement that animates each one goes in opposite direction. Caritas loves the 
object for the object’s sake, not for the lover’s sake. Caritas’s movement aims at an other; it 
longs for what it cannot possess and keeps it at a distance; it is love that adores and 
worships. For this reason, caritas’ ultimate object is unlike anything in the world and can 
never be owned. Caritas’s desire never appropriates its object. By contrast, cupiditas 
attaches itself to one of “those things that can be lost;” it seeks fulfilment in the possession 
of transitory things of all sorts. Insofar as cupiditas attempts to order the beings it covets to 
its own private good, it ultimately has only one object: itself; cupiditas’ love is amor sui. 
Cupiditas makes its object subservient to the self. What it seeks in the object is not the 
object itself but one’s own jouissance. Human love, qua cupiditas, is fundamentally 
acquisitive and the value of the object it seeks is a function of the gratification it promises. 
From that standpoint, property is an expression of cupiditas since to claim ownership is to 
appropriate, to turn an object into something ‘privatus’ (self-centered).  
The opposition of caritas and cupiditas is the foundation of the two cities. “Two societies 
have issued from two kinds of love […] worldly society has flowered from a selfish love 
which dares to despise even God, whereas the communion of saints is rooted in the love of 
God that is ready to trample on self.”32 Should we stop at this stark dichotomy, it would 
seem that no earthly goods could be the object of caritas and that the only path to the 
heavenly city requires transcending or suppressing the self. Yet, the demand to sacrifice 
one’s own happiness seems not only psychologically but also logically impossible. We 
cannot simply oppose term to term caritas and cupiditas in such a way that the affirmation 
of one term entails the negation of the other. While cupiditas excludes caritas, the converse 
is not necessarily true. The very turn toward the heavenly city and God could not occur if 
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 Augustine, City of God, Book XIV, Ch. 28, transl. Henry Bettenson, (London Penguin books 
1984), 593 
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the lover didn’t assume that it is there that her own true good and felicity resides. If 
acquisitiveness is in the nature of human love, then self-love not only cannot be eliminated 
but it is a component of loving God. She who is willing to “trample on self” is still doing so 
because she is seeking a good and, as we learned from Plato, that which is intrinsically good 
is also necessarily beneficent. Thus, a new structure must be proposed, a hierarchy of 
measured or proportioned loves must mediate the initial dichotomy of caritas and cupiditas. 
The possibility of some justice within the city of man (and consequently of some just 
property) demands that the two orders be more than mutually exclusive. Privately owned 
goods which are object of cupiditas can nevertheless be rightly governed when they are 
directed to the common good. Instead of demeaning self-love, one must consider how self-
love can be oriented to the final end. Legitimate property may be a human device that 
follows from the post-lapsarian condition, it may depend on rights granted by some secular 
proclamations, but through the decrees of emperors and kings God has distributed these 
rights to humanity.
33
 Thus, God neither commands nor prohibits but rather permits all to 
proclaim this right in the earthly city. 
The divide between the eternal city of God and the temporal city of man leads to a dual 
approach to property and wealth. Insofar as they depend on the relative and temporal 
decrees, adjudications of claims are better left to human jurists. As a consequence, the 
question concerning the most equitable distribution of wealth among citizens is of little 
concern for Augustine. Alms are necessary for salvation, not for social justice. But insofar as 
we must prepare for the city of God, our present disposition toward wealth and our use of it 
is of crucial importance. One who clings to those things that can be taken from us against 
our will “becomes subject to those things which ought to be subject to him and creates for 
himself goods whose right and proper use require that he himself be good. But the man who 
uses these rightly proves that they are indeed goods, though not for him (for they do not 
make him good or better) but become better because of him.”34 While neither the owned 
property nor ownership itself can be said to be righteous, the righteousness of the agent 
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grants some goodness to her property and her use thereof. Thereby, morality and property 
can be reconciled. 
In medieval Europe Augustine’s views on matters of property will rarely be challenged. 
They will, however, be adapted to changing circumstances. Many scholars have observed 
that a shift of attitude occurred around 1200 when the claim that wealth is inherently sinful 
began to erode.
35
 In that regard, Aquinas plays an exemplary role insofar as he managed to 
simultaneously maintain a tradition of moral suspicion toward private property and 
acquisition in general while accommodating important new social development. To do so 
without contradiction depends on carefully distinguishing the case of the laity and that of 
religious communities. Contemplative life requires the stricter standard of religious 
perfection, a demand that cannot be imposed upon the laity. Depending on the audience, 
Aquinas upholds the anti-wealth stand of the Church Fathers or a more tolerant attitude 
toward wealth accumulation.
36
 It is contrary to contemplative life to possess anything in 
private because, by definition, such a self-oriented practice induces a sinful self-love. In 
accord with Augustine, Aquinas declares that “the care that one takes of one’s own wealth 
pertains to love of self, whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters, whereas the care 
that is given to things held in common pertains to the love of caritas which ‘seeketh not her 
own,’ but looks to the common good” (II-II Q. 188, art. 7). But even the approval of 
common property among members of a religious order remains cautious: “the care that is 
given to common goods may pertain to caritas, although it may prove an obstacle to some 
higher act of caritas such as divine contemplation or the instructing of one’s neighbor.” 
These last two are, of course, the very activities that constitute contemplative life. At best 
then, the care for common goods in monasteries and convents can be an expression of 
caritas if it remains subservient to the activities that properly constitute contemplative life. 
The laity, however, cannot be held to the same demands; there, private property, the search 
for profit, commerce, and even some (limited) form of usury all have a justified place.
37
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Turning to the question of the naturalness of property, Aquinas posits a conceptual 
distinction between the nature of an external thing and its use. In general, property means 
dominion and “dominion” denotes power. But clearly, we have no power over the nature of 
external things; they are what they are independently of our will and “we can work no 
change in their nature” (II-II, Q. 66, art. 1 ob. 3); consequently their nature doesn’t fall under 
our dominion. As regard their use, however, “man has a natural dominion over natural 
things, because by his reason and will he is able to use them for his own profit, as they are 
made on his account.” In linking this “natural dominion” to the use of things Aquinas 
appeals to the authority of Aristotle and Genesis 1:26 (“let him have dominion over the fish 
of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth…”). 
Human dominion has therefore a divine origin but it is limited to use and shouldn’t be 
confused with sovereign dominion.  
As such, the argument leaves many things unclarified. It is not clear, in particular, whether 
the distinction between the “nature” of a thing and its “use” leaves any room for human 
property in the full sense of the term. Thus, in his response to the objection according to 
which “no man should ascribe to himself that which is God’s” Aquinas appeals to a “natural 
dominion over things as regard the power to make use of them.” Yet, man’s “natural 
dominion” and his “power to make use” of them cannot be identical (from the fact that I use 
something it doesn’t follow that I own it). Even if sovereign dominion can only belong to 
God (insofar as his power extends to the nature of things), there still remains a distinction in 
human matters between use and property. In this respect, article 2 of Q. 66 provides an 
important development: first, Aquinas argues that “use” calls for common possession. 
Second, because the acts of procuring and dispensing external things are, as Aquinas puts it, 
“competent to man” (i.e., they agree with human nature) this makes property lawful. In 
addition, property is necessary for the reasons already articulated by Aristotle. Thus, there 
can be personal use of common property (one person at a time may read a book which 
nevertheless belongs to the library). In such a case, use and property remain distinct. 
Furthermore, while community of goods is ascribed to natural law, it doesn’t follow that “all 
things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one’s own: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
lender may without sin enter an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of 
something he ought to have for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss” (II-II Q 78, A 2, ad. 
1).  
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but because the division of possession is not according to natural law but rather arose from 
human agreement which belongs to positive law […] hence the ownership of possession is 
not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason” (Q. 66, art. 
2, ad 1). It is a matter not only of what the natural law commands, but of what it tacitly 
permits. Since private property is neither a part of natural law nor opposed to it, humans 
seem free to practice the private ownership of goods. Yet, Aquinas alters this apparent 
neutrality of the natural law by an appeal to the authority of Aristotle and the Old Law in 
terms of the effects of private property: “a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one 
is contented with his own”. Thus, while the division of possession is neither a divine 
command nor according to natural law, it is nevertheless rationally and practically 
preferable.  
The difficulty in ascertaining the legal place of property is linked to the fact that Aquinas 
inherits the Roman notion of ius gentium as a juridical sphere distinct from natural and civil 
law.
38
 Thus, Gaius understood natural law as the source of all laws and ius gentium as its 
application. Insofar as it is established by natural reason, ius gentium applies to all people 
while civil law bears upon Roman citizens alone. Jurists would also appeal to this distinction 
in order to adjudicate in matters that involved people from different nations when their 
respective civil laws didn’t agree. In that sense ius gentium may be better understood as a 
specification of natural law rather than as a legal sphere distinct from it. Aquinas defines lex 
naturalis as it applies specifically to men as “an inclination to good according to the nature 
of man’s reason, which nature is proper to him […] whatever pertains to this inclination 
belongs to the natural law; for instance to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among 
whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination” (I-II, Q. 94, art. 
2). Although ius gentium is not strictly identical with the first and second forms of natural 
law (i.e., self-preservation and the “inclinations that belong to human beings according to 
that nature which is common to all animals”) insofar as is the product of rational 
deliberation that draws consequences from true premises about human nature, it is distinct 
from local conventions. Chroust and Affeldt conclude from this that: “ius gentium 
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understood in this sense is not really the consequence of the fall of man […] Hence, private 
property is not so much an institution which has become necessary through the fall of man, 
than an institution of intelligent social co-existence based on ratiocination” (Chroust, 
Affeldt, 178). Aquinas’ appeal to Aristotle at this precise junction provides a justification to 
turn private property into a decree of ius gentium and makes it, if not a precept of natural 
law, at least an acceptable consequence thereof. This doesn’t remove the temporal and 
imperfect character of this institution but it makes it “conditionally justifiable on the basis of 
the ius gentium, while at the same time […] the community of all property and possessions 
is absolutely justified through the lex naturalis” (181). 
The lawfulness and goodness of private property is not an absolute and immutable 
characteristic; it depends on its ability to contribute to the common good. An indication of 
this conditional status can be seen in the fact that, in general, material goods are to meet 
human needs and purposes (i.e., the perpetuation of life and the development of virtues). 
Should it fail to serve this purpose (or should a more urgent need occur), the institution 
could be canceled. Thus in the seventh article of Q. 66, Aquinas famously declares that “it is 
lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another’s property, by taking it either 
openly or secretly, nor is it properly speaking theft or robbery.” Further, “in the case of a 
like need, a man may also take secretly another’s property in order to succor his neighbor in 
need” (ad. 3). It should be noted that the argument depends on a specific condition: the need 
in question must be “so manifest and urgent that it is evident that [it] must be remedied by 
whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger and 
there is no other possible remedy).” Any other appropriation of another’s possessions would 
be a theft and therefore a sin. Further, this permissibility derived from natural right doesn’t 
signify a return to a prior state of common property; it is simply a limited and temporary 
suspension of the law. The same is true with respect to superabundance. Natural law 
prescribes that what one owns in superabundance is owed to the poor for their sustenance; 
but Aquinas adds that the “stewardship of his own goods is left to the judgment of each so 
that from these he may meet the need of those suffering it.” Thus, short of dire necessity, 
superabundant goods become disposable for the welfare of others according to the judgment 
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of the original owner, but not by virtue of a common property right.
39
 In these matters the 
act remains discretionary not supererogatory and the determination of what is necessary and 
what is superfluous is left to individual judgment.  
 
III: Paupertas Altissima  
The anonymous Italian author of the burlesque Canzone del fi’ Aldobrandino (late twelfth or 
early thirteenth century) talks of his allegorical marriage to the cadaverous Lady Poverty 
whose relatives are Sorrow, Beggary, Longing, and Distress.
40
 Poverty brings suffering, 
disgrace, and shame. Dante, in contrast, portrays poverty as an unrecognized gift. For all the 
repugnance it elicits, poverty may be a mean of spiritual renewal and those who can overcome 
their initial revulsion may receive from her a great reward. The distance that separates the 
repulsive Lady Poverty of the Canzone from her allegorical Dantean counterpart (in Canto XI 
she is Christ’s wife and Francis’s lover) is huge and it is not, as it has been suggested, a matter 
of a “variety of coexisting attitudes and doctrines” or of historical “transformation of values” 
(Havely, 8-9); rather, it is first of all a matter of will. The poverty that is proclaimed (if not 
deified) as an ideal is voluntary. This alone separates it from the involuntary poverty which 
remains an ignoble calamity.  
With the emergence of mendicant orders in the 13
th
 century, the concept of property 
undergoes an unprecedented scrutiny. Between the 1279 bull Exiit qui seminat in which 
Nicholas III acknowledges that the Franciscans have abdicated every right of ownership while 
maintaining the simple de facto use over things and the 1322 bull Ad conditorem canonum in 
which John XXII abrogates Nicholas’ decision, a theological, legal, and philosophical debate 
rages over the nature of property and, by extension, the meaning of “rights.” Although the 
debate deploys the conceptual arsenal of scholasticism and although the Franciscan claim is 
defended on legal grounds, it is evangelical perfection as a preparation for a new and final era 
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that is sought. As the revised Franciscan rule of 1221 declares: “The rule and life of the friars 
is to live in obedience, in chastity, and without property […] remembering that of the whole 
world we must own nothing” (quoted by Pierson, 99). Poverty is pursued because 
contemplative perfection requires the greatest simplicity. The mendicants thought of their 
order as instrumental in “hastening the dawn of a new contemplative era in the life of the 
Church.” 41  No doubt, claims of evangelical perfection and demands of humility and 
subjection of the self are open to ambiguity and paradoxes. How can one publicly advocate 
humility without perjury? Thus, objection 14 in Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions on 
Evangelical Perfection raises this dilemma:  
You who present humility in appearance, either you consider yourself humble or you 
do not. If you do, you thus attribute yourself a noble virtue, and so you are proud. If 
you do not, then when external habit shows you to be humble, you bear one habit in 
your soul and another in your appearance and so you are a hypocrite.
42
 
Bonaventure responds by arguing that the mendicants’ humiliation is not a sign of acquired 
humility but a desire to strive to acquire humility. This may resolve the double-bind dilemma, 
but of course it leaves unanswered the further question of whether humility can ever be 
acquired without contradiction and if not whether it makes sense even to strive to acquire it. 
The rule of poverty which is essential to the Franciscan identity states: “Let the friars 
appropriate nothing for themselves, neither a house, nor a place, nor anything else.” In terms 
of its concrete application, it meant that the friars renounced private and common property but 
were allowed to use movable and immovable goods which belonged to the Church. In the 
Defense of the Mendicants (Apologia Pauperum) of 1269 (that is to say, in the wake of the 
polemics between secular and mendicant masters at the University of Paris) Bonaventure 
provided a sustained justification of this claim. The starting point is the distinction of four 
possible relations one can have to temporal things: ownership, possession, usufruct, and 
simple use. Since the last one is absolutely necessary to human life it is not based on secular 
laws and, as such, it is unrenounceable. “The life of mortals is possible without the first three 
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but necessity requires the fourth, no profession may ever been made that renounces entirely 
the use of all kinds of temporal goods.”43 More importantly, since use is simply a matter of 
fact, it doesn’t require establishing a right.  
The source of the difference between the first three cases and the last one (use) can be traced 
back to the will. Following the principles of Roman law, Bonaventure insists that there cannot 
be ownership where there is no will to own. This appeal to the will entails that property and 
ownership primarily depend on psychological and procedural conditions. The rule of poverty 
is thus not a matter of forsaking things; it is a matter of freeing oneself from the will to 
possess things. What is at stake in this debate, in Agamben’s words, is the “‘abdicatio omnis 
juris’ (abdication of every right) that is the possibility of a human existence beyond the law. 
[…] Franciscanism can be defined− and in this consists its novelty, even today unthought, and 
in the present conditions of society totally unthinkable− as the attempt to realize a human life 
and practice absolutely outside the determinations of the law.”44 This is possible only if the 
basic concepts of ius, dominium, proprietas, possessio, and usus become objects of sustained 
critical analysis that puts their limit to the test. What remains beyond (or below) them, 
untouched by the legalistic apparatus, is nothing more than mere life.  
Thus, the mendicant orders were seeking a forma vivendi (habitus). Such a life doesn’t violate 
the law for the simple reason that it places itself outside its jurisdiction. The legal terminology 
in which it is embedded tends to mask the nature of the debate. As we saw earlier, the Latin 
term “dominium” doesn’t simply refer to ownership (“proprietas”) but also connotes power 
and authority. Bonaventure distinguishes dominium proper from proprietas which is the right 
(ius) of dominion by which someone is said to own something. The third case, usufruct, 
seems prima facie less evident since usufruct is defined as a “right of enjoyment” that allows 
the holder to derive some profit or benefit from a property that is owned by another or is held 
is common ownership. Thus, by definition those who enjoy the benefits of usufruct do not 
claim to have a property right on the good (e.g., a parcel of land offered for lease) from which 
the usufruct is derived. However, although the beneficiaries do not own the property, they still 
have a right over the profit derived from it; the harvest from a field or the fruits from an 
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orchard are rightly “theirs.” For this reason, usufruct must be abandoned. The friars also 
renounce money, since it is not possible to engage in commercial transactions, to handle coins 
and valuable without having dominium over them.
45
 
Even a modern labor theory of property ˗ that is, the claim according to which property is a 
natural right that comes about as the result of the application of labor over natural resources ˗ 
is circumvented. Assuming that in the labor process some of it, somehow, enters “into” the 
object and is irremediably mixed with the material on which labor is exerted, this, by itself, 
would still not be sufficient to make it “mine.” Something else must be assumed. The fact that 
Bonaventure places usufruct along dominium and proprietas indicates that the mendicant 
project seeks not to renounce things, but to renounce a certain ethos toward things. In Richard 
of Conington’s terms: “no one has dominion without desire and will.” It is this animus 
acquirendi or will to acquire that is regarded as the source of property rights and consequently 
it is such a will that the friars must renounce.
46
 Bonaventure insists on this point:  
Since a sum total of things, for example an inheritance, is acquired through the sole 
acquiescing of the will, so also nothing more is required for its rejection than a 
contrary intention. And just as by means of a mere act of the will a stranger becomes 
an heir, so too by means of the opposite disposition he is immediately cut off from the 
inheritance” (Defense, XI, 9, 311)  
Life requires no more than a relation of “simple use” (simplex usus) toward things. But what 
does it mean to simply “have” something? Appealing to the authority of Timothy, 
Bonaventure claims that “He [Timothy] uses the word ‘having’ not in the sense of the power 
of dominium, but of the ability to use [ad facultatem utendi], as we say that we have anything 
we use, even though it doesn’t belong to us but was provided without cost by someone else.” 
(Defense, XII, 20, 343).
47
 Thus, the Franciscan rule of poverty doesn’t deny the legitimacy of 
property; it doesn’t have the revolutionary purpose of abolishing property, since it actually 
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depends on it; instead, it simply attempts to live without it and to demonstrate this possibility 
through its performance. Dominium is placed in the hands of the Church without which the 
Franciscan experience would be impossible. The mendicant project doesn’t advocate 
renouncing private property in order to return to a presumed original form of common 
property; it proposes ˗ and this is its true originality˗ to do away with property altogether. If 
we imagine common property as the zero degree in relation to which private property is 
super-added, then the Franciscans can be understood as seeking an infra-property form of life. 
As we saw, the argument depends on the premise that the will to own is the source of 
property. Bonaventure, however, doesn’t propose to do away with the will but appeals to 
another kind of volition that can be stronger than the desire to acquire. “A person would be 
unwise to prefer the compulsion of necessity to the spontaneity of the will in the works of 
supererogation. This is as absurd as if a person were to prefer the hanging of robbers to the 
suffering of martyrs, since martyrs suffer voluntarily whereas robbers suffer necessarily” 
(Defense, XII, 29, 353). The renunciation of property is an affirmation of the will; it is a 
willful renunciation of the will to acquire. The suffering it causes is self-inflicted and, in that 
sense, the order attempts to carry the abnegation of the martyrs in everyday life. 
“Supererogation” refers to the “counsels of perfection” (i.e., those counsels that concern acts 
performed beyond what God requires) and therefore indicate that the vows of poverty aren’t 
meant to be a universal precept. For this reason, the Franciscan contention isn’t and shouldn’t 
be confused with a critique of property. Not all forms of private property are sinful. As 
Bonaventure carefully observes: “it is certain that Clement’s dictum, ‘because of inequity one 
person says that this object is his, and another says it is his’ should not be taken as a universal 
statement but merely as one that applies in many cases” (Defense, IX, 3 251-2).  
Yet, the argument is ambiguous. If it admits that renouncing property is not for everyone; it 
also intimates that those who can live without it are spiritually above those who depend on it. 
It is impossible to use the language of perfection and imperfection without conveying this 
connotation. “Although riches, both private and common, can be possessed without sin, 
relinquishing them is a matter of perfection, because just as imperfection by itself is not sinful 
[…] so too perfection is not only the rectitude of justice but also a liberation. Since they are 
alluring and dangerous, riches prevent this liberation” (Defense, IX, 4, 252). Thus, not only is 
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this self-inflicted suffering liberation, but the renunciation it implies, while placing its 
practitioners outside the law, also perfects the law (Bonaventure calls it “rectitude of justice”).  
In 1279 Pope Nicholas III in the bull exiit qui seminat adopted for the most part 
Bonaventure’s argument but proposed to distinguish five kinds of relations to things, making 
a further distinction between the right of use (ius utendi) and simple factual use (simplex usus 
facti), the last one constituting the only relation to temporal things that is necessary for 
sustenance of life (Mäkinen, 96). To enjoy ius utendi is to use a temporal good as one’s own 
but such a use is still the exercise of a right established by some human covenant. By contrast, 
simple de facto use is mere employment. “By [the fact] that they [the Franciscans] seem to 
have abdicated the ownership, use, and dominium of any thing, it is not proved that they have 
renounced simple use of everything. That is, a use which, I say, having the name not of the 
use of right, but only of fact, being only factual, offers users in using only what is fact, 
nothing of right” (Mäkinen, 97). Nicholas’ appeal to the de facto/de jure distinction to 
differentiate between two forms of use places simple use outside the realm of jurisdiction. 
Yet, is this distinction tenable? Among the secular masters who first opposed the Franciscan 
argument, Gerard of Abbeville (died 1272) occupies a preeminent position. First, it is greed, 
argues Gerard, not possession, that perverts our relation to temporal things. Greed is unlimited 
and unsatisfied want. Appealing to Aristotle, Gerard (as well as his fellow master at the 
Sorbonne William of Saint-Amour) argues that the Franciscans do not opt for the virtuous 
choice (which would be the mean between greed and poverty) but simply select one extreme. 
Further, in his Contra adversarium Gerard adds a central argument that focuses on the 
use/dominium distinction: in the case of consumable things, ownership cannot be separable 
from use. “To say that you have only the use of them, and that the dominium pertains to those 
who have given them, until they are consumed by age, or until the food is taken into the 
stomach, will appear ridiculous to all, especially since among men usus is not distinguished 
from dominium in things that are utterly consumed by use” (Contra adversarium, cited in 
Mäkinen, 47).
48
 The assumption that guides this objection is that we can properly “use” 
something only if the substance of the thing in question retains its integrity. Whatever I use I 
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can return or restitute. If I reside in your house or borrow your horse, use and property can 
clearly be told apart. However, in consumption the thing ceases to exist (it is used up). Thus, 
in this instance at least, no matter how “simple” use is, it cannot happen without the exercise 
of dominium. Even an adamant defender of the Franciscan position such as Marsilius of 
Padua acknowledges that his claim goes against linguistic conventions since the term 
‘possession’ commonly conveys both the incorporeal ownership and the corporeal “handling 
of the thing or of its use or usufruct in the present or in the future.”49  
In answer, Bonaventure argues that the situation is similar to “the case of a son-in-power’s 
proprietory personal fund where the son-in-power has the use without having dominion over 
this fund for a single instant.” What the son-in-power [filius familias] enjoys then is the use of 
a possession that he can neither retain nor proclaim; “rather, it is sought through the son-in-
power for his father. So also in the case of these poor it should be understood that the 
dominium over the things they receive for their sustenance is delegated to the Father of the 
Poor, while their use is conceded to them.” (Defense, 310).50  
John XXII’s intervention in the poverty controversy adds an important doctrinal revision to the 
debate. In Quia Vir Reprobus (a vitriolic refutation of the Minister General of the Franciscan 
Order Michael of Cesena), John argues that property was originally private (in the sense of 
exclusive ownership).
51
 Appealing to Genesis 1:28 (“Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the 
earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and 
over every living thing that moveth upon the earth”) John concludes that property was God’s gift 
to Adam rather than the result of human fallen nature. Ockham and Marcilius of Padua (among 
others) will strongly oppose this view. Ockham in particular leads the charge by returning to the 
conceptual analysis of “dominium.” In the Work of Ninety Days written in 1332, Ockham claims 
that in a broad legal sense dominium refers to “a principle human power of laying claim to and 
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defending some temporal things in a human court.”52 In a narrower sense, dominium adds the 
following specification: “the [property] holder may treat it in any way not forbidden by natural 
law” (Ockham, 70). In either case, Ockham understands dominium as a right that arises from 
agreement and is a matter of civil law. A right allows one to litigate in court for the use of thing 
should this use be obstructed by someone else. This, however, is precisely what the mendicants 
have renounced. As for the dominion mentioned in Genesis, it is best understood as a power of 
use over temporal things. “Thus it must be conceded that in the state of innocence our parents 
had lordship, in some sense, over temporal things, nevertheless it should not be conceded that 
they had ownership of temporal things” (Ockham, I, 309). Focusing on the impossibility to 
separate use and dominion in consumable goods Marcilius of Padua, for his part, maintains that 
“one who is perfect could catch a fish and eat it, but nevertheless with the express vow of never 
contentiously claiming the said fish (or any temporal thing) in the presence of a coercive judge.” 
(303) thus suggesting that where there is no legal claim there cannot be ownership. Finally 
Wyclif argues that the crucial act in God’s dominion is one of lending, thus, men can only have a 
temporary share of whatever is on loan; in other words, human dominium over the world is, as it 
were, borrowed. 
53
 
These examples suffice to demonstrate that the dispute between the defenders of paupertas 
altissima and their opponents concerns the limit of the law. Gerard and John XXII find a 
contradiction in the idea of a right to use that would exclude ownership and this may well be the 
case; yet, what the Franciscans were seeking was something else, it was use without right. Thus, 
Gerard’s arguments appeal to civil law where property is attached to usufruct while Bonaventure, 
on the contrary, places poverty as a practice beyond the law. “If perchance someone tries to 
oppose our reasoning by claiming that there is a warning in civil law that use cannot be separated 
perpetually from dominion, we will answer that this principle of civil law has no application 
here, since the law pronounces such a decree lest dominion becomes useless, and hence be 
noting but an empty word” (Apology, 11.7). One of John’s most trenchant objections consists in 
arguing that use without a right to use cannot belong to a state of perfection since it is to act 
unjustly. This objection goes to the heart of the issue for if John is right, nothing can occur 
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outside the juridical sphere. Every act whatsoever is either just or unjust- it may be so in varying 
degrees, but it is never outside the juridical. In response, the mendicants argue that simple use is 
licit although it is not legal. This is why Ockham appeals to a “licit power” that is acquired by a 
mere revocable permission or grace and as such is not a right.
54
 If a rich man invites poor people 
and places food and drinks before them, the poor have the licit power to eat and drink, but they 
have not for that reason acquired a right since the host could, if he pleases, take the food away 
and the guest could not appeal to any right. “When the permission obtained cannot be revoked at 
will, a right is acquired; but when it can be revoked at will and the one having permission cannot 
by virtue of the permission litigate in court, no right is acquired” (Work of Ninety Days, Vol. 2, 
433). Only a permission that cannot be revoked constitutes a right, short of this, no right is 
acquired. 
The question, as Agamben puts it, is: “how can use− that is, a relation to the world insofar as it is 
inappropriable− be translated into an ethos and a form of life?” (144, emphasis added). Even 
nature depends on grace to exist and persist and although the mendicant renunciation doesn’t 
entail disdain for temporal goods and the natural world, it is a precarious existence that requires a 
radical trust in providence. By renouncing dominion and the right to earthly goods, the 
mendicants find themselves entirely sustained by what is not their own. What the opponents of 
the Franciscan experience were most worried about is thus the possibility of a form of life that is 
nothing more than this: life pure and simple, life beyond the law. Peter John Olivi, among others, 
stresses how the rule (by contrast with the law) requires to be lived: “it makes more sense to say 
‘living in obedience’ than to say ‘observing obedience’ or ‘obeying’: one says, in fact, that 
someone lives in a certain state or in a certain work only if his whole life has been applied to it, 
in which case he is rightly said to be and live and dwell in it.”55 Such a rule does not dictate the 
acts of a subject, but constitutes the agent itself. It does not establish common property but 
creates a cenoby (a “koinos bios”: a life that is both unique and common). The rule is not applied 
to life the way a universal precept applies to a particular case; rather, it produces a form of life 
                                                          
54
 See Siegfried Van Duffel and Jonathan Robinson, Ockham’s Theory of Natural Rights, 14-15 
http://individual.utoronto.ca/jwrobinson/articles/vanduffel-robinson_ockhams-theory-of-natural-rights.pdf 
55
 Olivi’s Rule Commentary, ed. D. Flood (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1972) 119 
31 
 
and produces itself in it.
56
 Rules of this kind (by contrast with deontic or governing ones), 
function as “constitutive norms” they institute what they command. Use designates then a space 
outside the law, a void that the law does not institute. Insofar as use entails a temporal process, 
insofar as it is a habitus, it cannot be appropriated. Thus, to relate to the world as something that 
is essentially inappropriable is to seek a form of life that is prior to the order of the law and that 
the law (despite all its coercive power) cannot erase. In this condition, the self is not constituted 
by its act of appropriation but by its activity of dwelling. Centuries after the medieval debate, the 
possibility of such a relation to the world remains to be discovered.  
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